TürkçeHow Should We Understand Morality?
Celal TÜRER*
In order to find an answer to the question of what morality is, the origin and meanings of the word ‘‘morality’’ must first be taken into consideration. This is because origins and meanings represent "indicators" that inform human consciousness of a reality that imposes itself on human consciousness and reflect the fact that the concept of ‘‘morality’’ can always have a voice and be meaningful. Within this framework, whether we take into account the Arabic word ‘‘morality’’, the Greek word ‘‘ethos’’, the Latin word ‘‘moral’’ or the Chinese word ‘‘道德’’, we can realise that the phenomenon of morality, under different conceptions, expresses a manifestation that constantly imposes itself on consciousness. This awareness demonstrates to us that the phenomenon of morality in many cases both refers to the code of behaviour adopted by the individual or society and reflects the spirit or mentality formed in the practical field by the set of values and rules or the wisdom of living that the individual or community has developed in relation to daily life. Analysing values and rules on the one hand, and the psyche or mentality on the other, can reveal the common denominator of both descriptive and normative meanings of morality, in other words, it can enable us to refer to the guide/guides for our moral actions. At this point, we are faced with the question of which field our statements refer to, namely, whether they refer to the states of consciousness of the individual or the actor of moral action, or to the rules or norms that the individual finds ready-made in the society, in which the individual lives, and adopts. In antiquity and in the Middle Ages, morality meant both the Good and the idea of consciousness in the sense of what is imposed as an obligation. For instance, ‘‘ethos’’, on the one hand, referred to the rules that a society developed over time and that each individual constituting the society had to abide by, and on the other hand, it referred to the consciousness of the actor of moral action in the face of the rules. This harmony was based on the idea of the ‘‘Good’’, which is the reflection of the understanding of Existence in the field of morality, and the knowledge that accompanies it, i.e. consciousness, which means obligation. It is seen that this situation has been maintained in Christian and Islamic ethics.
In the modern period, the concepts of ‘‘morality’’, ‘‘ethos’’ and ‘‘moral’’ were separated from each other both etymologically and in terms of usage by Descartes' prioritisation of the Metaphysics of Epistemology or the Existence of Knowledge. Morality has evolved into the conscious activity of the subject in accordance with the thought structure of the modern period and our references have been mostly met with ‘‘ethics’’. This situation has resulted in the need to distinguish between the Greek term ‘ethos’ and the Latin-derived term ‘morality’, which had not been confronted with such a distinction in their etymology and history of use in previous periods. From that point on, ethics has been used to refer to the investigation of what moral concepts actually are and what they mean, and what is ‘‘good’’ and what is ‘‘bad’’, while the concept of morality has been used to refer to intuitive morality, i.e. norms characterised by the effect of coercion/constraint. More precisely, instead of the problem of obedience to the rules existing in society, morality has turned into the problem of ‘‘being able to see what is right by exercising practical moral reason’’. However, these considerations should not lead to the assessment of ethics under the label of subjectivity. In our culture, H. Ali Yücel addressed this situation as follows:
We can refer to our actions in the way of doing what is known as ‘‘character/temperament’’ regarding the individual, and as ‘‘morals/customs’’ regarding the community. In other words, the positive and negative qualities such as truthfulness and lying in a certain and single person are called temperament, and the positive and negative value system such as lying and truthfulness in a society is called Customs (Moeurs) (1).
In the modern period, the ethics-morals distinction in the West and the ethics-ahlak distinction in our country reflect the situation explained above. While the concept of ethics now refers to a life project that is an answer to the question ‘‘how should one live?’’, the concept of morality has become an answer to the question ‘‘what do one have to do?’’ and refers to adherence to rules and compelling principles. Some thinkers have expressed this distinction on the basis of the difference between what is autonomous, uncaused, inexplicable and ‘‘closer to love’’ (ethics) and what is not autonomous and ‘‘closer to rules’’ (morality). Furthermore, it has also been suggested that the distinction is based on Aristotle’s principle of the predication of the norm by ‘‘morality’’, in which the ‘‘concept of ethics’’ is characterised by its own teleological perspective, and Kant, who defines the distinction from a deontological point of view and introduces us with ‘‘ethics of duty’’. For instance, Paul Ricoeur has explained the precedence of ethics over morality by arguing that it is a necessity for norms to pass through the filter of ethical goal and for the norm to refer to the goal in practical dilemmas, and thus that ethics encompasses morality (2).
Arguing that both Aristotelian and Kantian traditions are simultaneously dependent and complementary, Ricoeur has declared that the preference for ethics over morality leaves no room for doubt, since theory has priority over practice. As such, it has been considered as the necessity of adopting the principle of the ‘‘living a good life’’, which is a very classical and focussed original Greek view, instead of unconditional commands from outside or from above (categorical imperative).
Ricoeur asked the question of how we can relate this articulation between ethics and morality, that is, between the teleological goal and the deontological standpoint, to the problem of the ‘‘selfhood’’, and argued that since the human choice of the self is an ethical deed, the issue will ultimately find its correspondence on the plane of self-reference, and that what is called ‘‘self-appreciation’’ will correspond to the ethical goal, and the implication called ‘‘self-esteem’’ will correspond to the deontological standpoint, that is, the moral norm. This situation leads to the following phenomena. Firstly, self-appreciation is a more fundamental phenomenon than self-esteem. Secondly, self-esteem represents the face of self-appreciation under the regime of norms. Finally, when the dilemmas of duty provide a sound guide for testing norms, self-appreciation can be perceived not only as the source of respect, but also as its remedy (3). Based on the above explanations, it can be asserted that the teleological perspective finds expression through evaluations or valuations applied to the action, whereas deontic predicates impose a moral compulsion/constraint on the actor of the action by giving weight to the irreducible opposition between ‘‘what ought to be’’ and ‘‘what actually is’’. At this very point, Ricoeur claims that the gap between ‘‘what actually is’’ and ‘‘what ought to be’’ can be eventually bridged by demonstrating that the deontological perspective is subordinated to the teleological perspective (4). The consciousness, which seeks to understand which action is really moral, must be able to realise that when it attempts to discuss ‘‘the truth of moral principles’’, it has already stepped outside the realm of morality, since there is nothing left to hold it to any moral obligation (5).
(1) Hasan Ali Yücel, Felsefe Dersleri Metafizik, Ahlâk, Estetik, Maarif Basımevi, İstanbul 1955, s. 73.
(2) Paul Ricoeur, Onself as Another, translated by Hakkı Hünler, 2010, p. 233.
(3) Ricoeur, Onself as Another, p. 234
(4) Ricoeur, Başkası Olarak Kendisi, p. 235
(5) Burhanettin Tatar, “Ahlakın Kaynağı” İslam’a Giriş: Ana Konulara Yeni Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul 2008, D.İ. B. Yayınları, p. 197.
In fact, it will give voice to an ontological manifestation, that is, an existential event, which, as a result of its irreducibility to any form, always remains beyond forms and thus does not become the subject of technological thinking (6). In this existential manifestation, none of intention, action and consequence will be sufficient to represent morality on their own; therefore, morality will always refer to an phenomenon that encompasses all of these concepts and even constitutes more than their total sum. In this context, it needs to be understood that the meaning of perceiving morality as encompassing and binding, or of self-appreciation, is to be found in a) a life oriented towards the ‘‘good’’, b) in living with others, and c) in a journey of meaning that is hosted by just institutions (7).
In the light of the above arguments, it would not be wrong to suggest that the expression morality needs to be understood as 1) the acquisition of a phenomenological sensitivity/consciousness for moral experience, 2) self-realisation, i.e. the formation of a personality, and 3) ultimately the orientation towards a pluralistic morality. In my opinion, these points represent three dimensions of the manifestation of morality in existence. The first of these dimensions is the fact that although morality includes feelings, thoughts and actions in its essence, it is actually moral sensitivity that gives actions their ‘‘moral’’ character. Moral sensibility constitutes the endeavour to reveal what is obligatory and right to do in general. This endeavour is not a descriptive judgement of reality, and it manifests itself in our subjective judgements of value on the one hand and universalisable judgements of rights, duties and responsibilities on the other. Moral sensitivity also guides us on what to do in everyday human relationships when the claims, duties, rights and responsibilities of the parties are in conflict with each other. Based on all these, it would be correct to characterise moral sensitivity simply as a belief in the power of the ‘‘good’’ (8).
(6) Burhanettin Tatar, “Ahlakın Kaynağı” p. 206.
(7) Ricoeur, Başkası Olarak Kendisi, p. 235-241.
(8) Celal Türer, “Ahlaktan Eğitime: Yine Ahlak”, Felsefe Dünyası, 2014, volume. 60p. 8.
The second of these dimensions is that morality refers to self-realisation and the construction of our personality through our sensibilities (9). As a matter of fact, our sensitivities, which are formed in our experiences, need a continuity and coherence. Accordingly, when morality is regarded as a state of coherence and integrity that is maintained throughout life, personality can be depicted as a lifelong pursuit for integrity. Indeed, the personality, as a realm that exists under an individual form and can never be reproduced, refers to a construction process that is constantly being formed, lived inwardly, in which we maintain an inner moral sensitivity, in which we always have good intentions and in which we integrate different qualities (10). Life opens the individual first to the interrelationship of consciousnesses and then to eternity, thus enables the individual to gradually construct his/her personality. However, a person can never be regarded as having a personality in the true sense of the word. Because personality is an axiological category, that is, a category of value. This means that value and personality represent two different aspects of an action. The creative act expands the field of values on the one hand and the field of personality on the other. The subject who is engaged in the achievement of its competence through the continuity of creativity must continue to remain a person at the end of the process as it was at the beginning of the process. At this point, personality does not represent a composite or sum of parts, but rather an original completeness (11).
Personality can essentially be perceived as a constant acceptance or rejection of being oneself (12). This indispensable harmony is reflected in all the actions of the person. The person thus constitutes the centre of existence. While the individual lives as a part of society within a naturalistic category, the personality emerges from a transcendental sphere (the moral sphere) and never becomes a part of society. The reality of society, i.e. the reality of the we, does not precede the reality of the self, i.e. the reality of being oneself. Therefore, the centre of existence is always located in the self, which embodies all relations. In order to transform its personality, which belongs to the transcendental sphere, into a human personality in the physical world, the self binds its reason to values, that is, it realises its existence by participating in values and by incorporating values into itself (13).
(9) Celal Türer, “Değer ve Kişilik”, Felsefe, Edebiyat ve Değerler, Kahramanmaraş Belediyesi Yayınları, 2014, p. 222.
(10) See: Kenan Gürsoy, Etik ve Tasavvuf, Sufi Kitap, 2008, p. 15-54
(11) Veli Urhan, İnsanın ve Tanrı’nın Kişiliği, Ankara Okulu, 2002, p. 33.
(12) H. Ziya Ülken, Ahlak, Ülken Yayınları, 2001, p. 208.
(13) Veli Urhan, İnsanın ve Tanrı’nın Kişiliği, p. 62-65.
The participation of reason in values does not mean that reason loses its power of reasoning and becomes completely passive, but rather that it ceases to be pure reason and becomes practical reason, that is, it becomes a subject by embodying the values within its personality. As a matter of fact, this is the reason why, when morality is mentioned in our culture, the harmony between the metaphysical principle, which is the essence of creation, and the inner heart, which is the basic substance of human personality, in other words, the ‘‘sincere’’ orientations arising from the purity of the inner heart rather than the directive commands that try to impose themselves externally, is understood. Based on the above explanations, we can evaluate that morality refers to the opening of human beings to the meanings they attribute to life, to themselves and to the Transcendent at the most sacred level, the movement of human beings to open themselves towards the Absolute and the realisation that they are in the presence of the Almighty. The journey that begins within oneself evolves towards the return and turning towards the Divine by recognising the limits of the human being and grasping oneself from within. In this process, the person encounters two different spheres. The first of these is the transcendental aspect, that is, the sphere that manifests itself in the form of duties, values and norms for which the individual is responsible. The inner element is the inner self. The individual actualises oneself by comprehending oneself from within, that is, by becoming a person who knows what and why he/she does what he/she does.
The third of these dimensions is that the morality ultimately tends to recognise that the orientation of other subjects/wills towards the sphere of values can be achieved in different ways. Values, which point to a transcendental sphere that emerges in the relations between subjects, begin not only with the recognition of the other in voluntary struggle, but also with the recognition and respect for the fact that the other has thoughts, plans and goals in accordance with his or her position as a moral subject. Recognition of the other is essentially an affirmation that ‘any value in the world is just as real as any other value’, which constitutes the first principle of morality. However, respect for other values does not imply the abandonment of the values one holds, but rather an effort to harmonise them through a transformation that depends on social institutions rather than on one’s own will. Accordingly, impartiality is not a state of insincerity or disinterest in the values of the others, but, on the contrary, connecting with them through respect. The ‘‘truth of the world of values’’ begins by adopting the understanding that in every case where there is an evaluation in this world, it is not fundamental whether it is yours or mine. This means, in other words, attempting to perceive the world of values as ‘‘idiosyncratic things’’ that should be treated by all human beings as a phenomenon in their own time and space, and as a mere phenomenon of value, in a ‘tolerant’ way, ‘‘regardless of who produced them in the first place’’. Secondly, it is the recognition that values and actions that seek to harmonise life have more significance. To be reasonable at this point is to use arguments and attempt to persuade the other individual morally, rather than to argue with another person whose values contradict one’s own. Thus, reasonableness is inseparable from the practical application that underpins our ability to harmonise contradiction.
The above statements imply that morality cannot be solely reduced to moral sensitivity, self-realisation, or a pluralistic morality. Perhaps what is really important is that all these aspects are appropriately brought together in experience and performed in the most appropriate manner. The fact that it is possible to bring these elements together in a different and more beautiful way means that morality can be performed more beautifully than it has been performed so far. Because morality, as Tatar emphasises, is ultimately what makes us who we are, what shapes our disposition, nature, temperament and character, and is itself shaped by these attributes. If we are always incomplete and imperfect and can always perceive an event according to our own character, temperament and nature, then it is possible that we can always conceive of a more perfect morality (14).
(14) Burhanettin Tatar, p. 209.
As one can clearly see, the endeavour to understand morality is not an attempt to find a basis or standard for morality or to identify a fixed purpose of morality. Rather, it is an endeavour to understand the nature of moral experience and how it is realised in the social and physical environment, and to develop the potential to intelligently exploit and transform the opportunities offered by experience in a contingent world in order to build a better life. In this regard, due to the open-ended nature of morality and the imprecision of moral situations, the evaluation of humanity in this field will always continue. This is because people have always been in search of a criterion to reach a decision and evidence in the moral sphere. For this reason, any evaluation of morality will represent the broadest view of research or investigation. In order to develop a comprehensive and satisfactory understanding of morality, the implications and objectives of the moral vocabulary must always be carefully analysed. In this respect, the most fundamental criticism or evaluation that can be made is to analyse morality in the course of its evolution. In addition to the ongoing evaluation of morality in itself, criticising existing moral understandings is an endless process, since it would mean analysing the qualities of existence and therefore the qualities of our experiences.
When we are able to comprehend morality as a manifestation of the principles that reveal how we ought to live, what are the elements of ultimate and highest value in life, and ultimately what elements a just society ought to contain, we can realise that the demonstration of what morality is, or its source, will sometimes proceed through ‘‘particular moral experiences’’ and sometimes through the conflict experiences among ‘‘general moral principles’’ (15).
(15) For this reason, the morality is defined in general as ‘‘a set of rules that are considered to be absolutely good or arising from a certain understanding of life, a set of principles or a collection of rules that people live according to themselves and take as a guide for themselves’’ whereas, the morality is specifically defined as ‘‘a set of attitudes and behaviours that express the good qualities or personality of a person, i.e. temperament’’. Ahmet Cevizci, Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü, Paradigma Yayınları, 2000, p. 5.
We can list the following phenomena that manifest themselves in this tension:
1) In my opinion, the first thing to know about morality is that it is not an event that has already happened, but rather an ongoing and continuous event. This means that morality must always be understood within human consciousness and that the efforts to understand morality are continuous and the understanding of morality is inexhaustible. In other words, there is a need for the consciousness to be always alert to see how morality is manifested, and for our ability to understand to be constantly expanded and refreshed. Moral enquiry essentially goes hand in hand with our ability to understand; the more our theories of understanding morality are expanded and tested, the more our moral consciousness will develop. This means that what morality is essentially has a deep relationship with what humanity is. This is because morality is largely determined or shaped by our perspective on being human. This reminds us that being human and being moral can be a kind of identical phenomenon.
2) As human beings, we encounter morality explicitly as we experience the process of becoming human. We encounter morality both in our individual and social life. To put it more clearly, we encounter morality as we make the transition from being a humankind to being a human being, as we learn and adopt the rules applicable in social life. This means that morality is an order of rules on the one hand, and on the other hand, morality is a characteristic of human beings. Although morality is not inherently found in human beings, it becomes an ability that humans acquire through their endeavours. At this point, it would be a great mistake to reduce morality to a mere mental function or not to realise that it is a phenomenon that emerges through behaviour. In this sense, the connection of knowledge with morality can only be understood as referring to a state that is manifested in behaviour. Because actions ultimately represent the will of the actor of moral action, what he/she means, his/her intention, purpose, in short, his/her essence. This demonstrates that morality is a manner of being that emerges or is manifested on the basis of knowledge and action.
3) It is a very common fallacy of many of us to see morality as if it were a sphere outside of the human being, which determines or prescribes the human being. Of course, the sphere of values encompasses us regardless of whether we are aware of it or not, but the effectiveness of this sphere emerges with the actor of moral action who realises it. Even if the sphere of values has the most sublime contents, it does not manifest itself in consciousnesses that are not aware of it and cannot comprehend it. This situation shows us that morality is primarily an event of gaining sensitivity. The more the perpetrator of moral action develops his/her moral consciousness and the more he/she reflects on his/her moral behaviour, the higher level of moral consciousness/awareness he/she will develop. Such a consciousness reveals a useful and profound method of analysing the moral situation. In the event that the individual cannot reach the judgement of the situation with the necessary level of deliberation, moral decision-making and behaviour fails to take place. The loss of the capacity to make sensitive distinctions about morality and the fact that choices become dull and routine indicate a state of moral corruption. Moral corruption is the inability of the actor of moral action to bring a solution to complex or uncertain situations. At this point, the golden rules, order or commandments that the tradition has previously provided to the actor fail to provide assistance. Because such rules only function in situations that can be known. However, the essence of morality lies in the inherent existence of uncertainty and conflict.
4) The manner of existence of morality in a society is closely related to the processes through which the society has passed and how it has come into existence. Because morality may vary and change according to the constituent elements and coordination of the society. Indeed, it is a generally accepted fact that different forces have determined the moral development of humanity in the historical process, that humanity has been mostly influenced by political organisations (clans, despotic kings, the emergence of the city, democracies, political demands), that economic problems, industrial practices, trade and banking have had a wide-ranging impact on the emerging morality, and that similarly legal processes have had a significant impact on moral life. We can argue that capitalist mechanisms of production and consumption today force and even inhibit the will and behaviour of the actors of moral action in an unprecedented way. In addition to this, it must also be acknowledged that moral life is becoming increasingly complex and influenced by different independent forces. For instance, while weight loss or slimming has so far been seen as a will-based activity that determines the person, today it is moving towards becoming an event that is carried out with a number of devices inserted into the stomach. The replacement of the will by technological applications and tools leaves us with the question of whether the same thing will happen in the moral sphere. Likewise, the transition from face-to-face relationships to online relationships announces to us that moral life has changed its mode. In order to understand the impact of the patterns and changes in social life on moral life, we need to refine our understanding of how it manifests itself today.
5) Although morality basically begins with the preferences of the actor of moral action, it ends with the realisation by the actor that the orientations of other subjects/wills in the field of values may vary. Since the sphere of morality signifies a transcendental sphere encompassing the relations between subjects, values not only begin with the recognition of the other in a voluntary struggle, but also with the recognition or acknowledgement and respect for the fact that the other also has thoughts, plans and goals in accordance with his or her position as a moral subject. Recognition of the other is essentially an affirmation that ‘any value in the world is just as real as any other value’, which constitutes the first principle of morality. However, respect for other values does not imply the abandonment of the values one holds, but rather an effort to harmonise them through a transformation that depends on social institutions rather than on one’s own will. Accordingly, impartiality is not a state of insincerity or disinterest in the values of the others, but, on the contrary, connecting with them through respect. The ‘‘truth of the world of values’’ begins by adopting the understanding that in every case where there is an evaluation in this world, it is not fundamental whether it is yours or mine. This means, in other words, attempting to perceive the world of values as ‘‘idiosyncratic things’’ that should be treated by all human beings as a phenomenon in their own time and space, and as a mere phenomenon of value, in a ‘tolerant’ way, ‘‘regardless of who produced them in the first place’’. Secondly, it is the recognition that values and actions that seek to harmonise life have more significance. To be reasonable at this point is to use arguments and attempt to persuade the other individual morally, rather than to argue with another person whose values contradict one’s own. Thus, reasonableness is inseparable from the practical application that underpins our ability to harmonise contradiction.
6) Although morality is fundamentally based on human choices and behaviour and on relations with other people, these elements alone often do not guarantee the existence of morality. To put it the other way round, morality may not become a skill in one person or in many people. Then, in this case, is it necessary to give up morality and refer its potential to certain other situations? In human history, the existence of morality has always been accompanied by the existence of moral people. Truly, the existence of masters of life, warriors of morality or, in the words of our culture, wise people in a society constitutes a prerequisite for overcoming the moral problems faced by that society, even that period and humanity. Accordingly, it is the result of the fact that morality is an acquired quality of the moral person, and that these moral people do not fall into the mistakes that ordinary people can easily fall into, and that they bring different levels and aspects to morality. This demonstrates that ethics, as pointed out above, is a discipline that spreads from person to person in life and is learnt from the masters. Morality is learnt from the masters, the warriors of morality, who understand what it means to ‘‘be a human’’, who have internalised the knowledge of how to live, who give people faith, confidence and determination to work, and who mobilise people and revive their souls. Therefore, the place where we learn morality is the exemplary people who realise, actualise and live it. Ordinary people learn how to behave from these examples and adopt these behaviours by transferring/modelling them to themselves. These examples are so internalised that the style of behaviour becomes the property of the person taking the example. This is not imitation but rather internalisation. This situation indicates that morality is basically taught in life and during relationships.
Another approach to support this argument is that two thousand five hundred years ago, Socrates sought an answer to the question ‘‘Can morality/virtue be taught?’’, as we ask today. Plato and Aristotle, who were his disciples, also put forward their own thoughts in the context of this question and emphasised that moral knowledge is a separate knowledge and that the best way to learn it is ‘‘exemplification’’. Morality is indeed a knowledge, but what makes it special is the knowledge of being an example. Morality is indeed a knowledge, but what makes it special is the knowledge of example. So, of what thing does morality constitute the knowledge of the example? If this question is answered in the language of our culture, morality is the knowledge of becoming a wise person, and morality begins as soon as the consciousness of this situation is achieved. This consciousness indicates that discourses on morality can only be realised when we can become a wise person through our knowledge. This also points out that we should always stick the needle into our own flesh first in the matter of morality. Because only when we understand where we stand in morality, when we are able to question the negative traits within us, when we are able to face ourselves and encounter the depths of our own inner world, we can become a person who has integrated his knowledge and morality.
Given the framework presented above, the endeavour to understand morality needs not to be reduced to an attempt to find a basis or standard for morality or to identify a fixed purpose of morality. Rather, it ought to be an endeavour to understand the nature of moral experience and how it is realised in the social and physical environment, and to develop the potential to intelligently exploit and transform the opportunities offered by experience in a contingent world in order to build a better life. In this regard, due to the open-ended nature of morality and the imprecision of moral situations, the evaluation of humanity in this field will always continue. This is because people have always been in search of a criterion to reach a decision and evidence in the moral sphere. For this reason, any evaluation of morality will represent the broadest view of research or investigation. In order to develop a comprehensive and satisfactory understanding of morality, the implications and objectives of the moral vocabulary must always be carefully analysed. In this respect, the most fundamental criticism or evaluation that can be made is to analyse morality in the course of its evolution. In addition to the ongoing evaluation of morality in itself, criticising existing moral understandings is an endless process, since it would mean analysing the qualities of existence and therefore the qualities of our experiences. It would be appropriate to say that the virtuous act of understanding this process can be the only value of finite-intelligent being.
Bibliography
Ahmet Cevizci, Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü, Paradigma Yayınları, 2000.
Burhanettin Tatar, “Ahlakın Kaynağı” İslam’a Giriş: Ana Konulara Yeni Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul, D.İ. B. Yayınları, 2008.
Celal Türer, “Ahlaktan Eğitime: Yine Ahlak”, Felsefe Dünyası, 2014.
Celal Türer, “Değer ve Kişilik”, Felsefe, Edebiyat ve Değerler, Kahramanmaraş Belediyesi Yayınları, 2014.
Hasan Ali Yücel, Felsefe Dersleri Metafizik, Ahlâk, Estetik, Maarif Basımevi, İstanbul 1955.
H. Ziya Ülken, Ahlak, Ülken Yayınları, 2001.
Kenan Gürsoy, Etik ve Tasavvuf, Sufi Kitap, 2008.
Paul Ricoeur, Onself as Another, translated by Hakkı Hünler, 2010.
Veli Urhan, İnsanın ve Tanrı’nın Kişiliği, Ankara Okulu, 2002.
*Prof. Dr. Ankara University